A Protective Order Has Teeth – Counsel Disqualified After Court Finds Violations

E-Discovery LLC - A Protective Order Has Teeth – Counsel Disqualified After Court Finds Violations By Michael Berman
Image: Holley Robinson, EDRM.

[EDRM Editor’s Note: The opinions and positions are those of Michael Berman.]


In US Dominion, Inc. v. Byrne, 2024 WL 3792654 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2024), violations of protective orders led to disqualification of counsel.

The court began its decision by stating:  “This case arises out of the 2020 U.S. election. Plaintiffs US Dominion Inc., Dominion Voting Systems Inc., and Dominion Voting Systems Corporation (‘Dominion’) sue Defendant Patrick Byrne (‘Byrne’) for defamation related to allegedly false statements Byrne made about Dominion’s role in that election. ”  Id. at *1. 

After the case commenced, Stefanie Junttila [Lambert] (“Lambert”), Esquire, entered an appearance for Byrne.  The court wrote:

This dispute centers on [the] discovery process, specifically repeated instances of non-compliance with the Court’s Orders governing the disclosure and use of discovery material. From June 2023 until March 2024, all counsel and Parties in the case (including Byrne) seemingly abided by the Amended Protective Order (“Protective Order”) governing discovery. … Before even her first appearance in this case on March 12, 2024, however, Byrne’s new counsel, Stefanie Junttila [Lambert] (“Lambert”), began openly violating orders, including by disseminating protected discovery material. …  Due to Lambert’s actions, thousands of documents (“Dominion’s Litigation Documents”) which all Parties, including Byrne himself, had agreed to keep confidential, have now been shared widely in the public domain. Lambert and Byrne continue to evade the Protective Order and this Court’s March 19, 2024 Order (“Status Quo Order”) that prohibits further dissemination until resolution of this Motion.

Id. (emphasis added).

Dominion filed an emergency motion for protection and to disqualify counsel.  It also reserved the right to seek additional sanctions.”  Therefore, at this juncture, the US Dominion court wrote that:  “The only questions currently before the Court are whether Lambert violated court orders and rules, and if so, whether she should be disqualified from this case.”  Id.   

The protective order “contained a  “broad prohibition against using any Discovery Material outside of the related litigation….” Id. at *2-3.

According to Dominion, the Parties negotiated the Protective Order “[g]iven the national security concerns regarding voting machine information and the personal security concerns for Dominion employees—many of whom have been the subject of threats in the past.”

Id. at *4.

However, despite the broad order, the US Dominion court wrote that “Lambert and Byrne unilaterally decided to disclose thousands, if not millions, of Dominion’s Litigation Documents to third parties and then promote the public dissemination of the documents through those third parties.”  Id. at *6.  The court wrote:

At the March Hearing, Lambert did not dispute that she: 1) signed an Undertaking verifying that she would comply with the Protective Order; 2) gained access to Dominion’s Litigation Documents; and 3) disseminated those documents in the manner Dominion alleged. … She also disclosed details about the scope of her alleged breach for the first time. … She reported that she not only gave Leaf documents, but that she also gave him a username and password to the entire repository of Dominion’s Litigation Documents.

Id. at *6. 

A second order then issued:  “At the March Hearing, the Court ordered temporary protective relief to prevent any further dissemination of Dominion’s Litigation Documents….”  Id. at *7.  That was followed by a third, “Status Quo Order.”

However, the court then wrote: “Neither the Court’s March Hearing nor the [subsequent] Status Quo Order deterred Lambert or Byrne’s continued misconduct. Lambert and Byrne continued to discuss and disseminate the documents and, in some cases, actively sponsored others’ dissemination of the documents.”  Id

The US Dominion court then gave examples and added: “After the Court gave her ample opportunity to explain her conduct, Lambert never contested that she made or shared any of the posts at issue, participated in any of the interviews, or otherwise engaged in the conduct that Dominion asserts violates the Protective and Status Quo Orders.”  Id. at *8.

The court held another hearing in May 2024.  At that time, Dominion made a “detailed presentation” of “misconduct using social media posts, interviews and other statements.” Id. at *9.  It added:  “Although Lambert disagreed about Dominion’s characterizations of these actions, she did not dispute either the underlying conduct or the authenticity of any of the documents Dominion cited in its presentation.”  Id.

After the May hearing, the court wrote: “Despite assuring the Court that they understood and would comply with all of its orders, Lambert and Byrne continued to disregard them.”  Id. at *10.  The court wrote that “because the documents were already in the public domain due to Lambert’s own unilateral actions, Lambert argued that they were no longer subject to the strictures of the Protective Order.”  Id.  Further, it wrote that Lambert continued to attempt to disclose information.  Id.  at *10-11.

The court described the impact: “Because of Lambert and Byrne’s actions, Dominion’s Litigation Documents are now widely available to the public. As Dominion points out, the documents and related commentary have been viewed hundreds of thousands of times….  Lambert and Byrne’s actions have led to serious threats to Dominion and its employees.” Id. at *12 (emphasis added).

Lambert’s conduct in these cases reflects a concern that she has a personal stake in advancing her claims against Dominion, and that personal stake overrides her regard for court orders and rules even in the face of such admonishment.

US Dominion, Inc. v. Byrne, 2024 WL 3792654 at *14 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2024).

After stating that disqualification is an extraordinary remedy, the court wrote that “the record clearly shows that Lambert deliberately violated multiple court rules and orders and continues to do so despite having had ample warning of the consequences and assuring the Court she would comply. Lambert’s repeated misconduct raises the serious concern that she became involved in this litigation for the sheer purpose of gaining access to and publicly sharing Dominion’s protected discovery. Because Lambert’s ‘truly egregious misconduct’ has already and will undoubtedly continue to ‘infect future proceedings,’ this is the rare case in which disqualification is warranted.”  Id. at *2 (emphasis added).

Lambert argued that her motivation was good.  The court wrote: “Regardless of Lambert’s motivations, it is clear that before she entered her appearance in this case, she has shown a concerning pattern of conduct that gives the Court further pause that she would follow its orders.”  Id. at *13.  The US Dominion court cited decisions from other courts involving her and concluded that “Lambert’s conduct in these cases reflects a concern that she has a personal stake in advancing her claims against Dominion, and that personal stake overrides her regard for court orders and rules even in the face of such admonishment.”  Id. at *14.

In short: “This Court enforces protective orders consistent with their language.”  Id. at *14.  The court wrote that:  “There is no reasonable dispute that the Protective Order governs Dominion’s Litigation Documents.”  Id.  It found violations of two orders:

First, the US Dominion court stated: “Lambert and Byrne have violated a number of the provisions of the Protective Order.”  Id. at *15.  Second, the court wrote: “Lambert and Byrne have also violated the Court’s Status Quo Order, despite both verifying that they had and would comply with it.”  Id. at *16.  It listed specific examples.

The court concluded that Lambert violated D.C. Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) and (c).  The first prohibits interference with the administration of justice and the latter prohibits misrepresentation to the court.  Id. at *18.

It also rejected several arguments against sanctions.  First, it disagreed with the idea that Dominion’s disqualification motion was a bad faith “tactical” effort to “stifle the truth….”  Id. at *22  Second, Lambert unsuccessfully asserted that the documents provided evidence of some of the “most serious crimes in national history and are a matter of national security” and there was a “public interest” in disclosure exception.  Id.  It also rejected an argument based on the fundamental right to vote:

Lambert cites no authority for these broad and significant assertions. Although she references cases that recognize the fundamental right to vote and articulate the general elements of alleged crimes, she cites no authority for the proposition that she was justified as a matter of law in taking the actions she did….  When pressed, Lambert’s only answer to the Court for failing to cite any relevant authority was simply, and repeatedly, that the fact that her actions are justified is as obvious as the proposition that “water is wet.”

Id. at *22 (emphasis added). 

The court proceeded to address each argument presented to justify the disclosures.  To give only one example, the court wrote that: “Lambert has failed to substantiate any of her conclusory allegations that Dominion’s Litigation Documents contain evidence of national security crimes. She has not, for example, pinpointed certain documents and made an argument that they meet the elements of any particular crime. Nor has Lambert explained why, when faced with these documents supposedly reflecting serious crimes of national importance, she chose to disclose them to a single county sheriff in Michigan as opposed to a national law enforcement agency such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation or Department of Justice.”  Id. at *23.  “Finally, even if Lambert had a valid reason to disclose Dominion’s Litigation Documents, she still has offered no viable, let alone meritorious, argument to justify all of her other misconduct.”  Id. at *24.

The court concluded:

There is no question that disqualification is a rare sanction…. This, however, is one of those rare cases where the circumstances of Lambert’s misconduct are “truly egregious” such that her continued involvement would “infect future proceedings.”…. The Court agrees with Dominion that no lesser sanction will suffice. There are at least five reasons that illustrate why Lambert’s conduct meets the high bar for disqualification: 1) Lambert’s breach of the Protective Order was intentional, had significant consequences, and was without justification; 2) Lambert has since repeatedly violated court orders and made misrepresentations to the Court; 3) Lambert’s prior conduct and admonishment undermines her argument that she acted in good faith and reflects her disregard for the Court’s orders and rules; 4) Lambert has not refuted Dominion’s argument that if the Court should impose a sanction, disqualification is the most appropriate; and 5) Lambert’s conduct has already severely tainted this proceeding and will continue to do so if she remains counsel in this case.

Id. at *26 (emphasis added).

The court added: “The record is clear that Lambert’s initial breach of the Protective Order—disclosing anywhere between thousands and nearly three million of Dominion’s Litigation Documents before she even entered her appearance in this case—was massive and intentional.”  Id.  It wrote that:

Lambert clearly views compliance with Court Orders with which she does not agree as optional, which is incompatible with our judicial system. Allowing Lambert to continue as Byrne’s counsel when she has already demonstrated a willingness, if not determination, to do whatever it takes to advance her theories infects this proceeding and jeopardizes this Court’s ability to depend on counsel and parties adhering to their rules, obligations, and the law.

Id. at *27 (emphasis added).

“In her short time as counsel in this case, Lambert has caused exponential harm that cannot be undone. The Court’s only meaningful option to mitigate the specific risk of future harm Lambert poses is by removing her from this case.”  Id. at *28.

The bottom line is that, in her short time as counsel, Lambert has repeatedly shown that she has no regard for orders or her obligations as an attorney before this Court. See e.g., ECF Nos. 103 at 40:6–14 (“I have an obligation to report criminal acts that I reviewed in this discovery that are black and white and clear. I can see fraud of services in these documents. I can see conspiracy in these documents.”); 106. Lambert’s blatant disregard for this Court and her obligations is unending; her actions have already severely infected this proceeding. There is no doubt that they would continue to do so if she were permitted to remain counsel in this case. This Court cannot allow such intentional, dangerous, and relentless misconduct to continue. Lambert is immediately disqualified from serving as counsel in this case.

Id. at *31 (emphasis added).

Lambert’s lawyer has said that there will be an appeal.  Pro-Trump lawyer removed from Dominion case after leaking documents to cast doubt on 2020 election (msn.com)

Author

  • Miichael Berman's headshot

    Mike is the owner of E-Discovery, LLC, and of counsel at Rifkin Weiner Livingston LLC, in Baltimore. He concentrates on commercial litigation and offers mediation services. He was the primary editor of Electronically Stored Information in Maryland Courts (Md. State Bar Ass’n. 2020), and he co-edited M. Berman, C. Barton, and P. Grimm, eds., Managing E-Discovery and ESI: From Pre-Litigation Through Trial (ABA 2011), and J. Baron, R. Losey, and M. Berman, eds., Perspectives on Predictive Coding (ABA 2016). Mike has litigated a number of cases in the trial and appellate courts in Maryland. He is an Adjunct Professor at the University of Baltimore School of Law where he co-teaches a three-credit discovery workshop that focuses on e-discovery. He has lectured at the Maryland Judicial College and he chaired the Bar committee that drafted the proposed ESI Principles for the District of Maryland. He is a past: co-chair of the Federal District Court Committee of the Maryland State and Federal Bar Associations; chair of the Litigation Section Council, Maryland State Bar Association; and, co-chair of the American Bar Association Litigation Section Book Publishing Board. He graduated from the University of Maryland School of Law and is also an Army veteran. He is admitted to the Maryland bar. The opinions expressed in this blog are not necessarily those of Rifkin Weiner Livingston LLC.

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