[EDRM Editor’s Note: The opinions and positions are those of Michael D. Berman.]

A court recently addressed Defendants’ Joint Motion for an Order Prohibiting the Use of Generative AI.

Defendants assert that “Plaintiffs’ continued submissions…bear the hallmark content of AI-generated material” and “bear the hallmark style of AI-generated material including in-line header vertical lists…overuse or misuse of boldface type…and links to code or tags in the output text.” … Defendants point out that “in Plaintiffs’ most recent filing – Plaintiffs’ Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint … – Plaintiffs’ submission went so far as to hallucinate a Board policy that simply does not exist.”

The Defendants relied on Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 and the court’s common-law inherent authority to support their motion for “an order prohibiting the use of artificial intelligence in the preparation of any filings submitted to the Court.” Boyd v. Beachwood City School Dist. Bd. of Education, 2026 WL 3181031 (N.D. Oh. Oct. 23, 2026). In the alternative, Defendants sought an order requiring disclosure of the use of A.I.

In opposition, Plaintiffs acknowledged their prior error. They accepted full responsibility. They further recognized their obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. They asserted that the error was factual—contents of a defendant’s policy—and not hallucinated cases. Finally, Plaintiffs assert that “[t]he Court should deny the requested blanket prohibition because Defendants have not shown the type of misconduct that would justify such an extraordinary restriction.”

Defendants replied, “by setting forth various examples of fabricated case law, misrepresented holdings, and fictitious quotations that Boyd and Antonio have already submitted to this Court.” They pointed to 12 hallucinations in one motion. Defendants argue that “these examples cast significant doubt on Plaintiffs’ assurances that they: (1) verified the factual content of their filings; (2) reviewed the final content; (3) accept responsibility under Rule 11; and (4) checked legal citations and authorities to the best of their ability.”

The Boyd court wrote that it recognized the benefits of the use of AI. However, it noted that, along with benefits, there comes risk.

The court wrote that, while the principles prohibiting citation of hallucinations apply “equally” to pro se parties: “Artificial intelligence has the potential to serve as an important tool to provide access to the courts for those who cannot afford counsel.” [emphasis added].

It then rejected Defendants’ motion to ban use of AI:

Because Plaintiffs are subject to Rule 11, the Court will not ban Plaintiffs’ ability to use artificial intelligence in this case. The Court finds that Rule 11 is an appropriate safeguard against the misuse of AI. The Court recognizes that Plaintiffs’ filings cite hallucinated case law and a hallucinated Beachwood City Schools’ policy. To be sure these hallucinated citations are Rule 11 violations, but the Court will not sanction Plaintiffs for this conduct at this time. In their Opposition, Plaintiffs acknowledged that they cited the hallucinated policy and “accept responsibility” for that mistake…. They further “recognize and accept their obligations under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.” … And the Court recognizes that outside of the TRO Motion, Defendants have not asserted that Plaintiffs have cited to any hallucinated case law in any other paper filed with the Court. Given that the hallucinated case law is not relevant to the pending motions before the Court, and Plaintiffs have acknowledged their mistake concerning the hallucinated policy, the Court exercises its discretion to not impose sanctions in this instance, including banning their ability to use AI going forward.

Id. at *5.

The court added: “But the Court expressly warns Plaintiffs that the Court will not hesitate to enforce Rule 11 going forward.” Id. at *6 (emphasis in original).

After a stern warning, the court wrote: “Contemporaneously with this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Court is referring this matter to Magistrate Judge Armstrong for general pretrial supervision, including overseeing service, conducting a Case Management Conference, overseeing the discovery process, and resolving all non-dispositive motions. Nothing in this Order shall be construed as limiting Magistrate Judge Armstrong’s ability to issue appropriate orders concerning Plaintiffs’ use of AI, including but not limited to prohibiting their use of AI to the extent necessary.” Id. at n. 4 (emphasis added).

Plaintiffs’ acceptance of responsibility appears to have been important. One court has stated that once fabricated citations are identified, a two-step process is appropriate. First, a court should consider what verification and inquiry was employed. Second, candor and correction should be heavily weighted mitigating factors. Cite Checking to Find Hallucinated Cases Deemed Insufficient – Part II – Verification and Candor Are Expected (Aug. 17, 2026); Booker v. U.S. Bank N.A., __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2026 WL 2254689, at *3-4 (D. Conn. Aug. 5, 2026).

The use of a warning, especially for a first offense, appears to be a trend in addressing hallucinated citations by unrepresented litigants. See Maryland Has Developed a Body of State Law Regarding Hallucinated Citations (Oct. 20, 2026).

Assisted by GAI and LLM Technologies per EDRM’s GAI and LLM Policy.